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1. INTRODUCTION
Historically, Australia’s infrastructure was 
originally owned and operated by the public 
sector at the federal, state and local government 
levels (Smith, 2004), however the majority 
of Australia’s critical infrastructure has been 
privatised with as much as 90% of the critical 
infrastructure under private sector ownership in 
some areas (Allard, 2008; TISN, 2004a). Some 
common examples of critical infrastructure 
systems and services that people rely upon 
include such essential services as electricity, 
water, health services, telecommunications and 
banking to name a few (AGD, 2008), although 
this may differ depending on the national cir-
cumstance of a particular country.
The Australian contextual definition of 
critical infrastructure as defined by the Trusted 
Information Sharing Network (TISN) is as fol-
lows. “Critical infrastructure is defined as those 
physical facilities, supply chains, information 
technologies and communication networks 
which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered 
unavailable for an extended period, would 
significantly impact on the social or economic 
well-being of the nation, or affect Australia’s 
ability to conduct national defence and ensure 
national security” (AGD, 2008; NCTC, 2004; 
TISN, 2004b, p. 3).
Importantly, in the context of this definition, 
“significant is defined as an event or incident 
that puts at risk the public safety and confi-
dence, threatens our economic security, harms 
Australia’s international competitiveness, or 
impedes the continuity of government and its 
services” (TISN, 2004b, p. 3).
Critical Infrastructure Systems:
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This briefly defines and outlines an inter-
pretation of critical infrastructure as a prelude 
to further discussing critical infrastructure in 
the context of a systems environment. A generic 
methodological approach is proposed as the 
foundation of the ensuing framework for the 
practical system security analysis and model-
ling of a critical infrastructure incident. It also 
seeks to determine a response to the research 
question of: how to critique and model critical 
infrastructure systems?
This is followed by a case study overview 
of the critical infrastructure incident and its 
subsequent system security analysis and mod-
elling as applied utilising the TARDIS frame-
work. Finally, a reflective look at the TARDIS 
framework briefly discusses its applied analysis 
and modelling approaches and concludes with 
identifying future research alternatives for 





The dominate architecture of distributed infra-
structure network systems is typically spanning 
long distances in the provision of infrastructure 
services from increasingly centralised produc-
tion modes (Zimmerman, 2004) and be it direct 
connectivity, policies and procedures or geo-
graphic proximity, most critical infrastructure 
systems interact. The ability to do this is a result 
of the complex dependency relationships and 
interdependency relationships that cut across in-
frastructure boundaries (Pederson et	al., 2006).
Furthermore, the concept of critical in-
frastructure connection is important to a wide 
range of social, economic and political issues 
depending on the potential implications and 
state of these reciprocal connections. In this 
context, the beneficial influences of two or 
more interconnected entities is the exchange of 
ideas, information, currency and other valuable 
goods and services that are for mutual benefit 
(Murray & Grubesic, 2007).
However, typically these infrastructures 
operate in a physical environment that is reflec-
tive not only of the individual inputs, outputs and 
states, but also influenced by other infrastructure 
behaviours and characteristics. Add to this the 
context in which owners and operators are push-
ing their own goals and objectives, constructing 
value systems for defining and viewing their 
businesses, analysing and developing models 
of their operation, and making decisions that 
impinge upon infrastructure architectures and 
operations. Even the operational state and physi-
cal condition of infrastructures influence the 
environment that in turn influences stress and 
demand on individual infrastructures; in these 
terms the environment and the infrastructure 
systems are interdependently linked (Brown 
et	al., 2004; Peters et	al., 2008; Rinaldi et	al., 
2001).
Another aspect of the systems environment 
is the heterogeneous aspects of infrastructures 
and the fragmentation between infrastructure 
systems where the connections via large tech-
nical systems enable the different systems to 
technologically coexist and function coopera-
tively. With such an array of differing systems 
and purposes a realisation is that the collapse of 
services from these systems would be potentially 
disastrous for entire economies and societies 
(de Bruijne & van Eeten, 2007).
In terms of critical infrastructure systems 
particularly, there has been some disagreement 
between scholars and experts in the field, but 
the body of work shares some common points 
of view that (Egan, 2007):
• Creating reliability over multiple man-
agement generations in complex, tightly 
coupled systems is difficult and extraor-
dinarily demanding;
• The hope of doing so grows increasingly 
distant as technological systems grow 
larger and more complex.
In addition to these two points, as infrastruc-
ture systems increase in criticality, through so-
cietal reliance, they produce potentially greater 
security vulnerabilities. The proliferation of 
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large, complex and tightly coupled systems, 
especially in private critical infrastructure man-
agement has led to an ongoing discussion across 
disciplinary lines about how to manage them 
for optimal reliability, security and resilience 
(de Bruijne et	al., 2006; Egan, 2007).
It remains that there will always be security 
issues involving large technical systems that 
involve varying combinations of hard technolo-
gies (pipes, pumps, wires, ducts etc.) and soft 
technologies (computer software, networks 
and the Internet etc.). Add to this the human 
operator including the human-machine interface 
and complex network topologies and archi-
tectures, the dependency and interdependency 
relationships between the internal operations 
of the systems and the external influences of 
the environment in which these infrastructures 
are situated (Balkovich & Anderson, 2004; 
Egan, 2007).
Therefore, critical infrastructure systems 
tend to be interdependent and even intercon-
nected and hence a systems failure, be it through 
natural disaster, sabotage or poor management 
can bring entire communities, their industries 
and utilities to a grinding halt. Just imagine for 
example, a major electricity failure can bring 
just about everything to a stop, from transport 
to workplaces, water supplies, telecommunica-
tions and transport hubs that would cause wide-
spread disruption and damage (Bentley, 2006).
3. SYSTEM ANALYSIS AND 
BLENDED METHODOLOGICAL 
APPROACHES
When viewed as a system environment, the abil-
ity to analyse and critique the security aspects 
together with modelling critical infrastructure 
systems offers an avenue for assessing critical 
infrastructure system incidents. Adopting this 
approach, leads to identifying vulnerabilities 
and locating inherent weaknesses and enabling 
solution development and implementation of 
appropriate remedial action to mitigate such 
security risks to system availability and service 
supply.
Obviously the characteristics of systems 
vary considerably and are largely the result of the 
type of system, open or closed and the external 
environment that interacts and influences the 
system functionally generally. Additionally, the 
relationships and influences exerted between 
subsystems within internal environment of sys-
tems also have a part to play in comprehending 
the subject system’s functionality and responses 
to differing and changing situations.
In general terms, applying system security 
analysis or system modelling approaches repre-
sents an interpretive concept of the real world 
system (Berntsen et	 al., n.d.) that provide a 
means of viewing the important aspects or the 
essence of the system at various levels, depend-
ing on the particular system modelling theme.
Common system modelling and analysis 
themes are as follows (Avison, 2003a):
• A three-level view, where the conceptual 
level is a descriptive high-level overview 
of the system domain, the logical level 
describing the system goals and inten-
tion, while the physical level describes the 
system itself including the technologies 
involved;
• The process modelling theme describes the 
logical analysis of the processes within the 
system and is a discipline that applies a ba-
sic technique of functional decomposition, 
which breaks down a complex problem into 
smaller, more manageable detail;
• The data analysis theme involves compre-
hending and documenting the data elements 
and their relationships within the system;
• The object-orientated theme models ob-
jects that represent elements of the system 
including people, data, processes and the 
interaction of these objects.
These themes each represent an approach 
to general system analysis or system modelling 
in the terms of their specific characteristics 
of application. However, there is no singular 
theme that nominally fits well in addressing the 
entire issue of critiquing and modelling critical 
infrastructure systems.
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3.1. Blending Methodological 
Approaches
Principally, a single methodology provides a set 
of detailed rules and guidelines to follow for 
achieving a highly focused and specific outcome 
that is the result of a highly structured, narrow 
approach to the specific task they are intended to 
address (Avison, 2003b). Therefore, the logical 
extension lies in utilising a number of individual 
approaches in combination, to bring together 
the characteristics of each specific method to 
address individually their specific area of ex-
pertise to meet the overall criteria and intention 
of the practical critiquing and modelling of 
critical infrastructure systems (Wood-Harper 
et	 al., 1985). Therefore, a blended approach 
utilising multiple system analysis and system 
modelling approaches in combination would 
conceivably bring together the characteristics 
of each that is applicable to the achieving the 
overall research goal of a method suitable for 
critiquing and modelling critical infrastructure 
systems.
3.2. System Analysis Modelling
The following modelling approaches may not 
necessarily be directly applicable to this research 
in singular terms of critiquing and modelling 
critical infrastructure systems. However, there 
are elements of each approach that are compli-
mentary with relation to information system 
analysis including (Dennis et	al., 2009):
• Functional Modelling is a description of 
the processes and the interaction of the 
system with its environment;
• Structural Modelling is a conceptual 
description of the structure of the data 
supporting the processes and presents the 
logical organisation of data without focus-
ing on the technical details of how the data 
is stored, created or manipulated;
• Behavioural Modelling describes the inter-
nal dynamic aspects of a system that support 
the processes by describing the internal 
logic of the processes without specifying 
the process implementation.
A solution may lay in the development 
of a generic multifaceted or blended method-
ological approach that outlines the adoption of 
multiple system analysis and system modelling 
approaches, as a hybrid methodology. This ap-
proach would combine multiple approaches as 
a single, multifaceted practical application for 
the system security analysis and system model-
ling of a critical infrastructure system incident
4. A GENERIC BLENDED 
METHODOLOGY
The following conceptual methodology outlines 
a multifaceted or blended approach for the 
system security analysis and system modelling 
of critical infrastructure system incidents. The 
approach illustrated in Figure 1 consists of a 
five phase process that combines the system 
analysis and system modelling methods together 
in a complementary manner that utilises the 
strengths of each individual methodology.
Figure 1 presents a formalised version of 
the generic conceptual methodology incorporat-
ing the feedback loop from the conclusions of 
Phase Five as a means of checking, amending 
and reviewing the initial Phase One and Two 
system analysis of the blended methodology. 
This circular revision process would only re-
quire the number of iterations as deemed neces-
sary by the analyst for the practical task of 
critiquing and modelling critical infrastructure 
systems, which forms the basis of the following 
framework.
5. TARDIS FRAMEWORK
The Targeted Analysis Representation of 
Distributed Infrastructure Systems (TARDIS) 
Framework shown in Figure 1 represents a 
practical procedural framework for assessing 
the system security aspects and modelling of 
critical infrastructure system incidents.
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The TARDIS framework design in Figure 
2 represents a practical approach suitable for 
critiquing and modelling a critical infrastructure 
system incident utilising a combined system 
security analysis, system modelling and analysis 
approach as shown: The principle application of 
the TARDIS framework is to apply system secu-
rity analysis and system modelling techniques 
to investigate historical critical infrastructure 
system incidents from a perspective of focusing 
on system security and resilience.
Furthermore, the TARDIS framework 
describes a pragmatic approach for analysing 
differing critical infrastructure incident con-
texts, from the global to organisational and the 
personal perspectives. The TARDIS framework 
is based on the proposed conceptual methodol-
ogy and incorporates a multifaceted and sys-
tematic approach to the system security analy-
sis and system modelling of critical 
infrastructure system incidents. Therefore, the 
TARDIS framework provides a starting point 
as a practical means for critiquing and model-
ling critical infrastructure system incidents from 
a security perspective.
6. TARDIS FRAMEWORK: 
APPLIED
The Targeted Analysis Representation of 
Distributed Infrastructure Systems (TARDIS) 
framework represents a formalised conceptual 
framework that presents a practical procedure 
for assessing the security aspects of critical 
infrastructure system incidents. This process 
includes the modelling of various scenarios for 
a reflective comparative analysis, which leads 
to the production of a System Report outlining 
improvements pertaining to system security of 
the critical infrastructure system incident (Pye 
& Warren, 2009). This research is the initial 
application of the TARDIS system security 
analysis and system modelling framework in 
response to the overarching research question 
of: how to critique and model critical infra-
structure systems?
6.1. Case Study Overview
The following case study briefly describes 
an actual electricity supply disruption to the 
distribution and transmission infrastructure 
Figure	1.	Generic	conceptual	methodology
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Figure	2.	The	TARDIS	framework
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supplying the western district of Victoria that 
occurred on 23 October 2006. The electricity 
supply ‘blackout’ incident originated at the 
Terang Terminal Station involving the 220kV 
switching infrastructure located within the Ter-
minal Station (NEMMCO, 2007). This resulted 
in the widespread loss of electricity supply to a 
partial section of the Victorian electricity dis-
tribution and transmission supply grid system.
6.2. The Applied TARDIS 
Framework
This infrastructure system is critical to maintain-
ing the supply of electricity to consumers in the 
south western region of the western district of 
Victoria. As outlined in the following practical 
application of the TARDIS framework.
6.3. Phase 1 System 
Security Analysis
6.3.1. System Synopsis
6.3.1.1. Normal System Operations
The normal operational intentions of these 
transmission systems is deliver electricity via 
the 220kV transmission system to the Terang 
Terminal Station for transformation and switch-
ing into the various 66kV sub-transmission 
distribution network systems, where further 
voltage transformation takes place to supply 
voltages suitable for the distribution transmis-
sion systems that supply individual industrial, 
business and domestic customers.
It is important to recognise that electricity 
distribution and transmission systems, namely 
the 220kV and 66kV systems, exist separately 
from each other with the 66kV system de-
pendent on the 220kV system as its principal 
source of electricity supply via the 220/66kV 
transformation infrastructure, located at the 
various terminal stations throughout the overall 
electricity distribution and transmission system.
The 220kV electricity supply transmis-
sion infrastructure distributes electricity from 
the Geelong Terminal Station to the Ballarat 
Terminal Station and Terang Terminal Stations 
respectively, and includes a 220kV electricity 
supply transmission infrastructure that links 
directly between Ballarat and Terang, as shown 
in Figure 3 (Powercor, n.d.).
The primary goal and purpose of the 220kV 
system, as shown in Figure 3, is to supply 
electricity to the terminal station at Terang, 
where voltage transformation of 220kV electric-
ity into 66kV electricity occurs switching the 
electricity supply into separate 66kV electric-
ity systems, feeding the areas surrounding 
Koroit, Portland, and Hamilton.
The normal operational intentions is the 
delivery of electricity via the 220kV transmis-
sion system to the Terang Terminal Station for 
transformation and switching into the various 
66kV sub-transmission distribution network 
systems, where further voltage transformation 
takes place to supply individual industrial, 
business and domestic customers.
6.3.1.2. Abnormal System Issues
On the 23 October 2006, the No.1 and No.2 
220kV busbars ‘tripped’ open (NEMMCO, 
2007) due to equipment failure and a subsequent 
fire in the No.1, system. This incident resulted 
in a significant interruption or ‘blackout’ that 
affected over 50,000 homes and businesses in 
south-west Victoria. All power supplies from 
Camperdown to the South Australian border 
were lost affecting the areas and surrounding 
districts of Terang, Warrnambool, Port Fairy, 
Portland, Hamilton, Mortlake, Cobden, Cast-
erton and Koroit for up to five hours (Miletic, 
2006).
The system failure was due to the explo-
sion of the No.1 220kV Bus Tie Circuit Breaker 
Current Transformer that instigated a chain of 
events that also destroyed the adjacent circuit 
breaker, resulting in a major fire at the Terang 
Terminal Station. However, all system protec-
tion mechanisms operated as designed within 
each zone, additionally the routine monitoring 
of equipment and plant at the Terang terminal 
station in the previous month had found no 
evident signs of discharging plant or equipment 
(NEMMCO, 2007).
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6.3.1.3. Corrective System Actions
The Terang and Warrnambool hospitals includ-
ing the Warrnambool central business district 
were the first to have their power restored by 
2.30pm and other areas were progressively 
bought back online, with most homes and busi-
nesses receiving power by 4.00pm (McRae & 
Buttler, 2006; Miletic, 2006).
The corrective actions energised the par-
allel 66kV power transmission line from the 
Geelong Terminal Station which enabled the 
restoration of critical supplies including the 
Terang Terminal Station which occurred at 
2.11pm. Subsequently, restoration of the No.2 
220kV busbar from the Moorabool Terminal 
Station was under load again at 4.16pm, which 
completed the restoration process (NEMMCO, 
2007).
6.3.2. System Limitations 
and Boundaries
6.3.2.1. System Limitations
The critical infrastructure system limitations 
are restricted to the 220kV and 66kV electric-
ity transmission and distribution that supply 
electricity to the south-west region of Victoria.
6.3.2.2. System Boundaries
The boundaries of each of these systems within 
this case study are limited to and include the fol-
lowing parts of the greater Victorian electricity 
transmission and distribution systems.
The 220kV transmission infrastructure 
lines occur between the following locations:
• Geelong Terminal Station >> Moorabool 
Terminal Station >> Ballarat Terminal 
Figure	3.	Victorian	electricity	distribution	grid	(Powercor,	n.d.)
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Station >> Terang Terminal Station >> 
Geelong Terminal Station.
The 66kV transmission and distribution 
infrastructure lines are as follows:
• Geelong Terminal Station >> Terang Ter-
minal Station.
• Terang Terminal Station >> Hamilton 
Terminal Station >> Terang Terminal 
Station loop.
• Terang Terminal Station >> Portland 
Terminal Station >> Terang Terminal 
Station loop.
• Terang Terminal Station >> Koroit Ter-
minal Station >> Terang Terminal Station 
loop.
The 220kV and 66kV electricity distribu-
tion systems represent the affected systems 
because of the Terang Terminal Station in-
cident and will be the primary focus critical 
infrastructure systems for this analysis and 
modelling process.
Further case study system assumptions 
include:
The 66kV transmission and distribution 
infrastructure was not supplying a 66kV power 
feed to the Terang Terminal Station at the time 
of the incident, and was only providing supply 
from the Geelong Terminal Station end of the 
supply system to consumers.
• The 220kV transmission infrastructure 
between the Ballarat Terminal Station and 
the Terang Terminal Station was not in use 
at the time of the incident at the Terang 
Terminal Station.
The mentioned transmission lines illus-
trated in Figures 3 forms the system boundar-
ies of interest in this case study and describes 
an incident pertaining to two interdependent 
infrastructure systems that supply electricity 
to south-west region of Victoria. The incident 
relates to a situation at the Terang Terminal Sta-
tion where a fire resulted in a loss of electricity 
supply to the south-west district of Victoria for 
an extended period. This case study outlines the 
effects of a compromised system availability 
issue and the subsequent effects on critical 
infrastructure system security of supply.
6.3.3. SSA
6.3.3.1. System Definition
In this particular instance, there are two elec-
tricity transmission and distribution network 
systems capable of working independently or in 
cooperation with each other, with the latter being 
the principal configuration for normal electricity 
transmission and distribution purposes.
The initial system is the 220kV electricity 
transmission network that is primarily respon-
sible for efficiently delivering 220kV voltage 
over extended distances to key terminal stations. 
The electrical transformation process converts 
220kV into 66kV electricity in readiness for the 
electricity distribution system.
The second system is the 66kV electricity 
distribution network responsible for the efficient 
distribution of electricity to remote regional 
locations. The electrical transformation process 
converts 66kV electricity into lower voltages 
for industrial, business and domestic customer 
consumption.
The electricity distribution network 
systems with voltages lower than 66kV that 
distribute power to the customer base are not 
considered here and are external to the declared 
system boundaries (Section 6.3.2.2).
6.3.3.2. Essential Capability Definition
In the case of the 220kV transmission network, 
the essential capability components include 
the Geelong Terminal Station, the Moorabool 
Terminal Station equipment and the electric-
ity transmission lines linking the two terminal 
stations. If any of these three components were 
to fail, the western half of the Victorian 220kV 
transmission system would be effectively off-
line for an extended period.
In the case of the 66kV transmission and 
distribution network in isolation, the transmis-
sion line infrastructure between Colac and 
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Terang including the respective terminal stations 
are essential capability components, as loss or 
failure of this line linkage or equipment would 
render the 66kV transmission and distribution 
network infrastructure west of Colac off-line.
6.3.3.3. Compromisable Capability Definition
As the 220kV and 66kV electricity transmission 
and distribution networks work cooperatively, 
there is a dependency relationship existing be-
tween the two. For example, if there is a failure 
or loss of the 220kV system, then this would 
likewise impact the supply performance of the 
66kV transmission and distribution infrastruc-
ture (Section 6.3.1.2).
Additionally, the loss of any of the ter-
minal stations at Ballarat and Terang would 
potentially compromise the integrity of the 
electricity supply to the south-west region of 
Victoria, and the loss of any or all of the 66kV 
transmission and distribution network feeding 
the Koroit, Portland and Hamilton areas, will 
also impact the supply integrity of the network 
and compromise consumer activities.
6.3.3.4. Survivability Analysis
The SSA scenario map in Table 1 represents the 
survivability analysis of the 66kV electricity 
distribution system focusing on the security 
of maintaining the supply and distribution of 
electricity within the 66kV network.
The SSA scenario map in Table 2 represents 
the survivability analysis of the 220kV electric-
ity distribution system focusing on the secu-
rity of maintaining the supply and distribution 
of electricity within the 220kV network.
The SSA network scenario maps in Tables 
1 and 2 represent the survivability system as-
sessment and identifiable security weaknesses 
of the 66kV and 220kV electricity distribution 
and transmission infrastructures.
6.4. Phase 2: Critical Infrastructure 
System Case Study Development
6.4.1. Situational Context Definition
The context focuses on the 220kV and 66kV 
electricity transmission and distribution in-
Table	1.	66kV	network	scenario	map	
66kV Network Scenario Map
Infrastructure
Scenario No. System Softspot Effects List
One Terang Terminal Station Equipment Failure.
Two Colac Terminal Station Equipment Failure.
Three Transmission Line Failure Between Colac & Terang Terminal Stations.
Four Koroit Terminal Station Equipment & Transmission Line Infrastructure.
Five Portland Terminal Station Equipment & Transmission Line Infrastructure.
Six Hamilton Terminal Station Equipment and Transmission Line Infrastructure.
Architecture 
Strategies Current Recommended
Resistance Over/Under Current/Voltage Protection. Physical Security Barriers.
Review Ongoing System Equip-
ment Maintenance, Testing and 
Monitoring Checks.
Recognition Logging changes in equipment performance and maintenance updates.
Maintain history profile of equip-
ment maintenance lifetime.
Recovery
Automatic Load Shedding and Manual Load 
Switching. System Recovery Contingencies and 
Procedures.
None.
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frastructure that delivers electrical power to 
consumers situated in the south-west region of 
Victoria (Figure 3). While the 220kV and the 
66kV electricity infrastructures can function 
independently, the normal configuration is for 
them to function cooperatively resulting in a 
dependency relationship. This relationship has 
a particular bias, where the loss or failure of the 
220kV system would directly impact upon 66kV 
transmission and distribution infrastructure and 
its ability to maintain the supply of power; but 
if the 66kV system failed then the loss of power 
would only be localised and would not in all 
likelihood impact detrimentally on the 220kV 
system performance.
The situational context definition of this 
analysis process is to focus on modelling both 
the 220kV and 66kV electricity transmission 
and distribution infrastructure systems within 
the specified limitations and boundaries as de-
clared previously in Section 6.3.1.2 and those 
potential system weaknesses identified in the 
scenario maps.
6.4.2. Abnormal System 
Event Description
The situation preceding the above incident of 
23 October 2006 was that the 220kV electric-
ity transmission infrastructure was delivering 
supply to the Terang terminal station as normal. 
This was furthermore supplying power to each 
of the separate 66kV distribution infrastructure 
systems to Koroit, Portland and Hamilton, via 
the step-down voltage transformation equip-
ment at the Terang terminal station.
According to the NEMMCO report (2007) 
on Monday 23 October 2006 at 11.47 a.m. the 
No.1 and No.2 220kV busbars tripped at the 
Terang Terminal Station in the Victoria. The 
busbar tripping incident interrupted a 90MW 
load and caused the loss of supply to the dis-
tribution networks supplied from this terminal 
station for approximately four and a half hours.
The load tripping incident was due to the 
failure of the No.1 and No.2 220kV Bus Tie 
Circuit Breaker Current Transformers. Subse-
Table	2.	220kV	network	scenario	map	
220kV Network Scenario Map
Infrastructure
Scenario No. System Softspot Effects List
Seven Geelong Terminal Station Equipment Failure.
Eight Moorabool Terminal Station Equipment Failure.
Nine Transmission Line Failure Between Geelong and Moorabool Terminal Station.
Ten Ballarat Terminal Station Equipment Failure.
Eleven Geelong Terminal Station Equipment Failure.
Architecture 
Strategies Current Recommended
Resistance Over/Under Current/Voltage Protection. Physical Security Barriers.
Review Ongoing System Equip-
ment Maintenance, Testing and 
Monitoring Checks.
Recognition Logging changes in equipment performance and maintenance updates.
Maintain history profile of equip-
ment maintenance lifetime.
Recovery
Automatic Load Shedding and Manual Load 
Switching. System Recovery Contingencies and 
Procedures.
None.
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quent investigations revealed that the explosion 
of the current transformer initiated a series of 
compromising events, which led to the destruc-
tion of the adjacent circuit breaker and a major 
fire at the terminal station (NEMMCO, 2007).
With the fault being located within the 
protection zones of both the No.1 and No.2 
220kV busbars, this resulted in the protec-
tion systems of both zones responding and all 
protection systems had operated as designed 
(NEMMCO, 2007).
The immediate response to this incident 
was that the Country Fire Authority (CFA) at-
tended and extinguished the fire. Subsequently 
at 2.11pm, the parallel 66kV transmission line 
from Geelong Terminal Station began to sup-
ply limited electricity to bypass the damaged 
220kV equipment and enable the restoration 
of critical supplies into the 66kV networks for 
emergency and essential services including the 
Terang Terminal Station (NEMMCO, 2007).
Then at 4.16pm with the full restoration of 
the No.2 220kV busbar from the Moorabool Ter-
minal Station, the No.2 220/66kV transformer 
was again under load. This action completed the 
full electricity restoration process into the 66kV 
transmission and distribution networks supply-
ing the regions surrounding Koroit, Portland 
and Hamilton respectively (NEMMCO, 2007).
By way of follow-up actions, the bus tie 
and associated current transformer are no lon-
ger required, as the Terang Terminal Station is 
being rebuilt, and the reconfiguration of both 
transmission lines to the Ballarat Terminal 
Station and the Moorabool Terminal Station 
are now double-switched at Terang. The failed 
circuit breaker was an older style ‘minimum oil 
volume type’ that had no previous history of 
catastrophic failure and there were still seven 
circuit breakers in service at that time; all are 
due for replacement by mid 2009. The current 
transformer was likewise an older style, ‘oil 
filled type’ and had no history of failure and 
there were still nine of these in service in the 
Victorian transmission network; all are due for 
replacement by mid 2009 (NEMMCO, 2007).
6.4.3. System Scenarios
6.4.3.1. System Scenario (Normal)
In the normal context of this electricity transmis-
sion (Section 6.3.2.1) distribution and supply 
system, the normal scenario represents the 
expected flow and delivery of electricity via the 
220kV transmission infrastructure to the Terang 
Terminal Station and the 66kV transmission 
and distribution infrastructure to consumers. 
This scenario reflects the expected functional 
operations of cooperative systems to meet their 
availability and service delivery goals.
6.4.3.2. System Scenario (Abnormal)
The abnormal scenario (Section 6.3.5) rep-
resents the impact of the failure incident at 
the Terang Terminal Station and the resulting 
service delivery failures for the 220kV transmis-
sion system including the 66kV transmission 
and distribution system and focuses on the 
causation factors and loss outcomes.
Additionally, system restoration began with 
the initial return of the 66kV supply the Geelong 
Terminal Station, followed by the subsequent 
full restoration of the 220kV supply from the 
Moorabool Terminal Station focuses on system 
recovery, availability and service delivery.
6.5. Phase 3: Conceptual 
Model Design
During the design phase, the primary system 
components and connections were identified 
and sketched out, following a Top-Down plan-
ning and system decomposition process using a 
‘Black Box’ modelling approach as discussed 
in Phase 3 of the framework and labelled as 
shown in Figure 4.
The Top-Down system design (Figure 4) 
illustrates the designs upon which the CPN 
system modelling constructions utilising 
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CPNTools will be built in the following Phase 
4.
6.6. Phase 4: Conceptual 
Model Development
The following figures represent critical infra-
structure system models developed in CPNTools 
from the Terang case study in the earlier phases 
of the framework.
Figure 5 presents the context (0) view of 
the critical infrastructure system functioning 
normally prior to supply disruption caused by 
the explosion at the Terang Terminal Station.
The presence of tokens (dots) in Figure 5 
at each infrastructure place throughout the 
model indicates the electricity supply service 
is present as per normal operational expecta-
tions.
Figure 6 presents the context (0) view of 
the system incident.
The loss of electricity supply is evident in 
Figure 6 as there are no tokens shown at the 
‘SouthWest Region 66kV Distribution’ place. 
This indicates that an incident has occurred in 
the electricity transmission and distribution 
system.
Figure	4.	Decomposed	system	model	design	planning	sketches
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Figure	6.	System	context	incident	model	view
Figure	5.	System	context	pre-incident	model	view
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Figure 7 shows the Level 1 decomposition 
of the ‘Terang TS 220kV’ place in the previous 
system model.
The tokens (dots) in Figure 7 still show the 
presence of electricity supply to the ‘Terang TS 
220kV’ place and still no tokens residing at the 
‘SouthWest Region Distribution’ place indicat-
ing no apparent electricity supply services at 
this infrastructure.
Figure 8 illustrates a Level 2 system 
model decomposition of the ‘Terang TS Zone 
1 Transform 220/66kV’ place indicating the 
presence of a token.
Figure 8 indicates where the incident has 
occurred with the Current Transformer (CT) 
explosion location labelled “** CT Explosion 
Here **” and the absence of system electricity 
service tokens beyond this point in the system 
model.
Figure 9 displays the resulting loss of 
electricity supply to the Level 2 system decom-
position of the ‘SouthWest Region Distribution’ 
infrastructure system.
Figure 9 illustrates via the absence of tokens 
throughout the system model that the electric-
ity supply is lost (‘blacked out’) to the entire 
Koroit, Portland and Hamilton regional areas 
and consumers.
Figure 10 represents a system context view 
of the initial electricity supply system recovery. 
As shown, the tokens indicating the presence of 
electricity supply service are once again present 
at the ‘SouthWest region 66kV Distribution’ 
place, although this is a precursor to the return 
of full electricity supply.
Figure 10 illustrates partial return of elec-
tricity supply to the ‘SouthWest Region 66kV 
Distribution’ place via the 66kV electricity 
transmission and distribution system of the 
‘Moorabool Region 66kV Distribution’ place 
switched through the ‘Terang TS 66kV’ infra-
structure.
Figure	7.	Terang	TS	220kV	Level	1	system	model	view	of	the	incident
52   International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism, 1(3), 37-58, July-September 2011
Copyright © 2011, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
Figure	8.	Terang	TS	Zone	1	transform	220/66kV	Level	2	incident	model	view
Figure	9.	SouthWest	region	distribution	Level	2	system	model	view
International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism, 1(3), 37-58, July-September 2011   53
Copyright © 2011, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
Figure	10.	System	context	Post-Incident	1	model	view
Figure	11.	System	context	Post-Incident	2	model	view
54   International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism, 1(3), 37-58, July-September 2011
Copyright © 2011, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
Figure 11 displays the full resumption of 
electricity supply.
The supply of electricity services is once 
again evident in Figure 11 with the presence of 
tokens at all infrastructure component places 
throughout the system model and the removal 
of temporary electricity supply.
6.7. Phase 5: Reporting 
Conceptual Framework Outcomes
6.7.1. Recommendation and 
Solution Development
The recommendation and solution development 
has not been undertaken due to the time that 
has elapsed since this incident; all recommen-
dations and changes derived from an industry 
investigation of the incident were implemented 
as reported in the NEMMCO Incident Report 
(2007) by the infrastructure owner.
6.7.1.1. Model Comparison
The following list constitutes Normal Scenario 
Assessment:
• 220kV transmission system extends only 
as geographically far west as Terang Ter-
minal Station.
• Terang Terminal Station represents a 
system ‘pinch-point’ where the 220kV 
infrastructure terminates and the 66kV 
infrastructure emanates to supply the 
Victorian South-West region of Koroit, 
Portland and Hamilton.
• Geelong and Moorabool Terminal Stations 
are central to the supply of 220kV and 
66kV electricity to the South-West region 
including the entire western half of Victoria.
6.7.1.2. Model Comparison Assessment
A comparison of the models indicates where 
the incident occurred and the resulting down-
stream outcomes, particularly when compared 
to the pre-incident model that shows the system 
functioning as expected, and the models relat-
ing to the post-incident responses showing the 
resumption of full system service.
6.7.1.3. Change Identification
The following list briefly reflects the findings of 
the industry investigation (NEMMCO, 2007):
• System changes resulting from the incident 
are now complete and in operation.
• The system capacity is appropriate for the 
current delivery electricity requirements of 
this infrastructure.
• The explosive nature of the incident and 
the zone crossover damage was unexpected 
and there had been no previous recorded 
failure of this equipment.
6.7.1.4. Solution Proposal
No solution proposal was necessary at the time 
and no further action was required.
6.7.1.5. System Report
Due to the rarity of such an extensive loss of 
electricity supply and the subsequent removal 
and replacement of equipment with new and 
more reliable equipment; including the imple-
mentation of all changes as identified in the 
NEMMCO Report (2007), no further action or 
system upgrades were necessary at this time.
However, an observational outcome of the 
system model was the structure of the electricity 
distribution and transmission infrastructure in 
terms of the importance and central role played 
within the architectural and functional aspects 
of the terminal stations. It is evident that the 
terminal stations play a key role linking the 
network structure and are the primary connec-
tion between the 220kV electricity transmission 
network and the 66kV distribution networks.
This represents a critical infrastructure 
dependency issue where the 66kV distribution 
system is dependent on the 220kV system in the 
context of the Terang case study. The system 
models demonstrate that the complete removal 
of this link effectively isolates the 66kV distri-
bution systems, which remained off-line until 
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progressively reconstituted as shown in the case 
study (Figures 10 and 11).
Furthermore, this illustrates the criticality 
of the terminal stations to the wider distribu-
tion of electricity to customers and consumers 
‘down-stream’ of the Terang Terminal Station. 
This represents a security vulnerability of the 
power system structure. The linking role of the 
terminal stations play is critical to the ongoing 
supply of electricity beyond their location as 
they tie together the 220kV transmission system 
to the 66kV distribution system, as this case 
study depicts.
7. REFLECTIVE DISCUSSION
In terms of the methods applied within the 
TARDIS framework and which system se-
curity analysis and modelling approaches are 
adaptable to analysing and modelling critical 
infrastructure systems, the following discussion 
briefly addresses each approach.
The Survivable Systems Analysis (SSA) 
offered a practical process for systematically 
assessing the survivability characteristics and 
properties of proposed systems, existing systems 
and modifications to existing systems (Ellison 
et	al., 1999; Ellison et	al., 2002). This is a key 
feature, as the intent of critical infrastructure 
systems is similarly to maintain the supply of 
services in the face of system security threats, 
vulnerabilities and unexpected operational im-
positions. SSA offered a four-step approach that 
enabled the development of a system security 
and survivability profile that mapped potential 
system weaknesses and points of compromise, 
through employing the SSA framework for 
identifying essential and vulnerable system 
components (CERT, 2002; Ellison et	al., 1998; 
Ellison et	al., 2000).
In terms of system modelling there were 
a number of approaches that offered differing 
characteristics to the system modelling aspect 
of the TARDIS framework. The interpretive 
Top-Down method approach for qualitative 
system modelling was utilised for the design 
planning activity in the TARDIS framework, 
as a precursor to the applied system modelling 
approach for the particular critical infrastruc-
ture system incident. The reason for using the 
Top-Down approach in this manner was that it 
was suitable for developing alternative world 
views and its reductive characteristic suited the 
interpretive development of the system model, 
particularly in terms of broadly defining the 
boundaries, connections and compartmentalis-
ing the system (Warren & Hutchinson, 2005). 
The Top-Down approach was very adaptable 
to the system model design and planning role 
in the TARDIS framework and provided a con-
sistent planning structure for drafting system 
model interpretations. The system decomposi-
tion feature delivers an incremental approach 
to detailing the lower-level subsystem and 
components of the system in preparation for 
developing various detailed conceptual system 
model representations of the critical infrastruc-
ture system (Marakas, 2006).
The primary system modelling approach 
utilised was the Coloured Petri Net (CPN) meth-
odology employing the CPNTools software 
system modelling environment (Jensen, 1998, 
2008). CPN system modelling was theoretically 
well founded and adaptable for application to 
discrete event systems characterised as net-
work connected, distributed with concurrency 
issues and dynamic properties and operational 
processes (Jensen, 1997; Jensen et	al., 2007). 
Furthermore, CPN system modelling is utilised 
to design a broad range of systems and processes. 
Although CPN system modelling has been pre-
viously applied in small system settings such 
as network communication, production process 
modelling and analysis, in terms of large system 
modelling, CPN is adaptable in this instance 
(Standards Australian, 2006).
Soft System Methodology (SSM) focuses 
on the analysis and modelling of qualitative ac-
tions and relations of human activity systems 
within a subject system (Checkland, 1999; 
Checkland & Scholes, 1990). In this instance, 
the application of the SSM learning cycle is for 
comparative analysis of various critical infra-
structure system scenarios developed during the 
CPN modelling process. This is an adaptation 
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of the original SSM intention of analysing and 
modelling the qualitative human situations in 
comparison to the world view of the system, to 
one of overlaying of the technological system 
view in comparison to the world view of the criti-
cal infrastructure system (Checkland, 2000). 
The aforementioned multifaceted approach 
adopted with the methodology and applied 
with the TARDIS framework has illustrated 
that each approach brings their own particular 
characteristics that have collectively proved 
adaptable and suitable for security analysis 
and modelling of critical infrastructure system 
incidents.
8. CONCLUSION
In conclusion and returning to the original 
overarching research question of:
• How to critique and model critical infra-
structure systems?
There is no single approach that conclu-
sively resolves this question. However, the utili-
sation of a multifaceted approach in a practical 
framework as demonstrated with the TARDIS 
framework, illustrates an interpretative style for 
the security analysis and modelling of critical 
infrastructure system incidents. Although the 
TARDIS framework’s hybrid adaptation of the 
systems analysis and modelling for critiquing 
infrastructure systems from a system security 
perspective is not definitive, it represents a start-
ing point for further investigation, application 
and research development.
In the immediate future, subsequent 
research is still required to further develop 
the conceptual methodology and apply the 
TARDIS framework to other types of critical 
infrastructure systems. This investigation will 
aid in tightening and improving the effective-
ness of this research approach, particularly in 
the areas of contingency planning and disaster 
recovery management to ameliorate incident 
management responses for Australian critical 
infrastructure system incidents. Furthermore, 
the implementation of social network analysis 
as the system modelling aspect of the TARDIS 
framework, offers any opportunity to investigate 
the human systems aspects of critical infrastruc-
ture systems. Particularly in terms of mapping 
the command and control aspects of responses 
to critical infrastructure incidents, disasters, 
emergency management and response.
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